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I S  S UR R O G A C Y  E T H I C A L L Y
P R O B L E M A T I C ?  
L E S L I E  F R A N C I S
R I S K S  ot exploitation in surrogacy, especially commercial surrogacy, are impressive, 
as eloquently documented by Donna Dickenson in th is volume. Many commentators 
also have written about potential harms to the child when gestation is achieved through 
surrogacy—from commodification in apparent baby selling, to unsafe pregnancy con­
ditions, to unfit parents or parents with abusive conceptions of who or what they want 
their child to be.1 Concerns have also been raised about the frequency with which appar­
ently voluntary commercial surrogacy is really a form of trafficking, either of the sur­
rogate or of the child. This chapter will assume that exploitation and its extreme form in 
trafficking, as well as these forms of harm to the child, are wrongs to be avoided in anv 
permissible surrogacy. If a sur ogacy practice inevitably incorporates or creates serious 
risks of these wrongs, the practice would be wrong. But supposing these harms do not 
actually exist or could be left aside, is surrogacy itself ethically permissible? Are there 
ethical reasons to question all surrogacy, even noncommercialized, uncoerced, and 
altruistic arrangements among family members? 
This chapter takes up less well-trodden questions2 about whether a surrogacy 
arrangement in which one person carries a pregnancy for another is ethically problem­
atic in itself—and if so, why. Pregnancy and delivery are quintessential bodily labor. 
One set of arguments tests whether carrying a pregnancy is the type of bodily labor 
one person ethically may perform for another, whether or not for pay. These arguments 
contend that surrogacy cannot be a permissible service, no matter how well intended 
or structured. Another set of questions probes the value and identity of the child, ask­
ing whether surrogacy is inevitably akin to baby selling or, if not, devalues the child in 
some other way. A final set of related questions attends to whether surrogacy properly 
respects the relationship between the pregnant woman and the child-to-be. The general 
strategy of the argument is to show that we cannot reject all surrogacy on any of these 
grounds without also rejecting other practices that we find acceptable. 7he conclusion is 
that although there are serious ethical issues about surrogacy arrangements, they can be 
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allayed by how these arrangements are structured and are far outweighed by the inter­
ests of infertile individuals or couples in becoming parents. 
Most surrogacy today is "gestational" surrogacy, in which neither the surrogate nor 
her partner contributes the gametes to be used in the pregnancy. I a ddress this torm 
of surrogacy primarily3 but begin with some remarks about "traditional surrogacy, 
because it initiated the practice and has to some extent continued to frame the debates. 
TRADITIONAL AND GESTATIONAL 
SURROGACY 
Surrogacy exploded onto the legal scene in the 1988 New Jersey case of Baby ,\/.4 In this 
case, Mary Beth Whitehead was the genetic and gestational mother of the child; William 
Stern was the child's genetic father; and William and Elizabeth Stern were the child's 
intended rearing parents. The pregnancy was achieved by artificial insemination using 
sperm from William Stern. The surrogacy contract provided that Whitehead was to be 
paid $10,000 for gestation of the child and doing whatever was necessary to terminate 
her maternal rights so that Elizabeth Stern would be able to adopt the child. Mary Beth 
Whitehead's husband was also a party to the contract; he agreed to do whatever was 
necessary to rebut presumptions of paternity under state law. After the baby's birth, 
Whitehead became emotionally distraught and sought to keep the child; Stern brought 
suit to enforce the surrogacy contract. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately con­
cluded that the surrogacy contract violated the public policy of the state, using instruc­
tive reasoning. 
Core to the court's reasoning was New Jersey's adoption statute. That statute prohib­
ited money payments in exchange for an adoption and imposed strict requirements on 
the relinquishment of parental rights, which was not permitted until after the child's 
birth. The court determined that the surrogacy arrangement employed private con­
tract law to circumvent these restrictions of the adoption statute. In the court's view, 
the money was being paid to obtain an adoption and not for personal services, despite 
provisions in the contract reciting that it was for services. Moreover, the contract was 
necessarily coercive because it created an irrevocable agreement, prior to birth or even 
conception, for the surrender of any resulting child, also not permitted for private adop 
tions under New Jersey state law. Adoption is for humanitarian purposes, the court said; 
in contrast, the surrogacy arrangement between William Stern and the Whiteheads 
was an economic arrangement "without regard to the interest of the child or the natural 
mother."5 
Several themes stand out in the court's critique of contractual surrogacy. The first is 
that carrying a child for another is not an ordinary service that can be the subject of ordi­
nary contract law. The second is that the woman carrying the child as its genetic and ges­
tational mother is the child's "natural" mother. This relationship can only be terminated 
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under very special conditions of either voluntariness (as with adoption) or malfeasance 
(as with the termination of parental rights for cause). These themes continue to sound in 
criticisms of surrogacy arrangements today. 
In another early surrogacy case, this time involving gestational surrogacy, the 
California Supreme Court reasoned quite differently.6 Mark and Crispina Calvert con­
tracted with Anna Johnson to bear a child created from Mark's sperm and Christinas 
eg§- Anna was to be paid sio,ooo and was to relinquish all parental rights to the child 
in favor of the Calverts. Rejecting adoption as a model, the court turned instead to the 
Uniform Parentage Act's treatment of the parent-child relationship between natural 
or adoptive parents and their children. Under that Act, any interested party can bring 
suit to determine the existence of a mother-child relationship; this includes the genetic 
mother of the child. Just as fathers can establish paternity by establishing the genetic-
linkage, so can mothers, reasoned the California court. Cristinas claim to parenthood 
was genetic, Anna's gestational; in that sense both had claims to a maternal relation­
ship with the child. According to the court, California law provided no basis for choos­
ing between the two; thus, the court examined the terms of the surrogacy agreement to 
establish intended parenthood. According to the court; "although the Act recognizes 
both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to 
procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she 
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law."8
Like the New Jersey court, the California court uses the language of "natural" moth­
erhood to describe what is also a legal choice—that is, the identification of the legal 
mother. Unlike New Jersey, however, California contends that the surrogate would not 
have been able to conceive the child in question without the intentions of the planned 
parents. The gestational mother is "agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly 
important service without (by definition) any expectation that she will raise the result­
ing child as her own."9 The arrangement could be fully voluntary, as at the time of con­
tracting Anna was not expected to "part with her own expected offspring."10 The court 
also opined that it is unlikely that prospective parents would choose to procreate in this 
way without taking the child's interests as central. 
Perhaps the difference between the New Jersey and California courts' analyses hinges 
on the difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy 
may involve a biological relationship between the intended mother and the child that 
traditional surrogacy does not, the genetic tie; with traditional surrogacy, the intended 
mother bears no biological relationship with her prospective child. Of course, ges­
tational surrogacy also may involve the use of third-party gametes, in which case nei­
ther the surrogate nor the intended mother is a source of the child's genetic makeup. 
Subsequent case law in New Jersey does reflect consideration of such genetic ties, at least 
to some extent. In a case decided in 2000, a sister carried an embryo created from the 
sperm of her brother-in-law and the egg of her sister who was unable to carry a preg­
nancy. The intended parents (with the surrogate's agreement) petitioned for a prebirth 
order to have the birth certificate list them as the child's parents. Bowing to the postbirth 
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right of the surrogate not to relinquish the child for adoption for 72 hours after birth, the 
court refused to issue the requested prebirth order. To support this conclusion, the court 
relied on the emotional ties created by pregnancy: the intended parents' "simplistic 
comparison to an incubator disregards the fact that there are human emotions and bio­
logical changes involved in pregnancy."11 However, as the window for relinquishment ot 
parental rights opened before the birth certificate needed to be filed at 5 days after birth, 
the court issued an order permitting the certificate to be changed before filing to list the 
intended parents as the child's parents, on condition that the gestational mother agree 
to relinquish her rights to the child. In a later decision, however, the New Jersey courts 
declined to extend this strategy to a case of gestational surrogacy in which the parties 
used a donated egg, so that the intended mother bore no biological relationship to the 
child and the gestational mother bore only a gestational relationship.11 Ihe intended 
parents claimed that application of the Uniform Parentage Act—the statute employed 
in the Baby M case—to allow the intended (and genetic) father to claim parentage on 
the birth certificate but not the intended mother violated equal protection, but the New 
Jersey court found that it did not as it tracked actual biological differences.1-" 
This reasoning of the New Jersey court that biological ties somehow matter—whether 
gestational or genetic—persists in some criticisms of surrogacy arrangements. Yet it 
leaves puzzles about which biological ties matter and why. Moreover, in contemporary 
surrogacy arrangements involving oocyte donation, neither the gestational nor the 
intended mother has genetic ties to the child (and the intended father might not have 
such ties as well). Fuller examination of the services and relationships involved in sur­
rogacy is thus critical to understanding its ethical permissibility. 
SURROGACY AS SERVICE 
Surrogacy is a quintessential act of bodily labor for another. It i s physically intrusive, 
involving pregnancy, birth, and in its gestational form, hormonal stimulation and 
embryo transfer. Are there reasons for thinking that it is wrongful for one person to 
perform such invasive bodily labor as a service for another? This section addresses the 
ethical permissibility of providing gestational services, whether or not in exchange for 
pay. If it were unethical to perform these services altruistically, it would presumably also 
be unethical to do so for less compelling economic reasons. 
The most sweeping objection to surrogacy doubts the permissibility of one person 
pertorming any invasive bodily labor for another. This claim is surely too strong: we per­
mit and even applaud people for donating organs for others or bearing babies in loving 
relationships where the nongestating partner has the primary desire for the child, both 
examples ot invasive bodily labor performed for the benefit of others. A thought experi 
ment in Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous abortion article (1971) illustrates. Thomson 
analogized pregnancy to dialysis with a human being providing the kidney: suppose, 
she asked, you were kidnapped by a society of violin lovers and attached to a great 
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violinist. Hie plan was to allow the violinist use of your kidneys for 9 months in a man­
ner that would save the violinists life and that would be inconvenient but not physically 
risky to you. Thomsons conclusion was that because the violinist had no right to the use 
ot your kidneys, it would be ethically permissible for you to unhook yourself from the 
arrangement; the analogy was used to show that it does not follow from a claim of the 
right to life (by the violinist) that there is a right to the means of life. To be sure, a "good 
Samaritan might continue to alow the kidney use, and a "minimally decent Samaritan" 
might do so for a short period of time, Thomson observes; her point is only that allow­
ing the continued kidney use is not morally obligatory. Subsequent commentary on 
Thomsons thought experiment has been primarily directed to supposed disanalogies 
between the hypothetical kidnapping and actual pregnancy. I k now of no discussions 
that have attacked Thomsons observation that it is ethically permissible for good—or 
decent—Samaritans to permit the ongoing use of their kidneys in this way. Yet this is 
exactly what would be questioned if it were thought impermissible to allow one person 
to provide such invasive bodily labor for another. 
A more limited objection contends that it is wrong for one person to provide particu­
larly risky or burdensome invasive bodily labor for another. For example, in organ dona­
tion living donors are assessed and rejected if the risks to them are judged to be too high, 
even if they are willing to consent to the use of their bodies in this way (e.g., Reichman 
et al. 2011). Surrogates are also assessed for risk and—at least i n programs complying 
with professional guidelines—rejected for significant physical or psychological risk 
(ASRM Practice Committee 2015; Daar, this volume). Thus if surrogates are appropri­
ately screened for risk, it would appear that level of risk does not present a principled dis­
tinction between this use of the body of another and other uses that are judged ethicallv 
permissible. To be sure, kidney or liver transplants from living donors are performed as 
life-saving measures for their recipients; carrying a child for another is not typically life 
saving, although it may be deeply meaningful. But to defend this distinction in this wav 
is to rely on contested judgments about whether assisted reproduction is a sufficiently 
weighty purpose to override the risks it might impose. One such judgment might be that 
services that carry a risk of death (as organ donation or pregnancy may in very unusual 
cases) are only permissible if their goal is to save the life of another. But this judgment 
would prohibit any rescue that risks the life of the rescuer (no matter how small the risk 
to save another from serious but nonfatal harm. Another such judgment might be that 
reproduction is not a sufficiently important service, but this defense devalues reproduc­
tive bodily services in a manner that remains to be argued. 
Indeed, we regard as ethically permissible other forms of physical labor for others 
that are quite risky. Nursing is an example. Over a third of nurses suffer debilitating back 
injuries primarily attributable to repetitive lifting and transferring of patients (Brown 
2003). Residential care workers have similarly high rates of injury (Harris 2013). These 
injury rates are far beyond those associated with normal pregnancy and birth. Although 
many lifts and transfers are performed to avoid morbidity such as sores, others are for 
quality of life reasons such as a nursing home patients ability to have meals with others 
or go outside. Many family members also perform these tasks in order to enable loved 
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ones to remain at home and in the community; although I k now of no data studying 
familial injury rates, presumably they would be at least similar to those ot trained pro­
fessionals performing the same service, likely with better equipment. 
Another more limited way to argue against surrogacy as a service is to argue that it 
is a special form of bodily labor for another that ought not to be compensated but that 
might permissibly be performed altruistically. As in the example ot the New Jersey case 
described above, intrafamilial surrogacy arrangements or close-friend arrangements 
may be desirable for some infertile couples (ESHRE Task Force 2011). Im plementing 
this approach are laws prohibiting commercial surrogacy but allowing uncompensated 
arrangements.14 This is only an objection to commercialized forms ot surrogacy, how­
ever; uncompensated surrogacy would remain permissible (as in many countries ot 
the world), unless it is inevitably tied to commercial surrogacy. However, examining 
arguments offered against commercial surrogacy presents the opportunity to consider 
whether they extend to noncommercial surrogacy as well. 
COMPENSATED SURROGACY 
Many jurisdictions prohibit paid surrogacy while permitting supposedly uncompen­
sated versions of the practice. Although my primary focus is the ethics of unpaid sur­
rogacy, examining issues about paid surrogacy can be revealing about unpaid surrogacy. 
A threshold problem with drawing the commercial/noncommercial line is the dif­
ficulty in distinguishing commercial from purely uncompensated forms ot surrogacy 
van Zyl and Walker 2013). Although there no doubt are arrangements in which the sur­
rogate receives no form of payment, many surrogacies—including those in jurisdictions 
that do not permit paid surrogacy—compensate for expenses the surrogate would not 
otherwise have incurred but for the gestation. These typically include medical expenses, 
maternity clothes (and perhaps new clothes post birth), compensation for lost wages, 
and other expenses associated with the pregnancy. Of note, these pregnancy-related 
expenses are so significant that it would arguably be unfair to the surrogate to expect 
her to bear them on her own.1 '1 Moreover, pregnancies do go awry at times, and it would 
seem especially unfair not to provide a surrogate with insurance against unexpected 
medical expenses. 
Recognizing these issues in distinguishing commercial from noncommercial sur­
rogacy, van Zyl and Walker (2013) argue that neither fully commercialized models nor 
fully altruistic models are appropriate for understanding the practice. As another reason 
for rejecting the purely altruistic paradigm, these authors also contend that it fa ils to 
take into account the reciprocal obligations parties in a surrogacy arrangement have to 
one another; for example, the surrogate has obligations to take care during the preg­
nancy and the intended parents have obligations to treat the surrogate with respect. 
Instead, van Zyl and Walker defend surrogacy as analogous to helping professions in 
which altruistic motivations are important, but fair compensation and the legitimate 
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expectations of the parties also are recognized. An additional advantage of the profes­
sional analogy, they observe, is that professionals typically have organizations and rules 
to protect them from unethical conduct—both their own and those of others. On their 
view, if surrogacy arrangements were subject to proper oversight, it would be appropri­
ate to entorce contracts on which the surrogate agrees in advance to relinquish the child 
to the intended parents. 
Unfortunately, surrogacy also may be cast in altruistic terms when this is not at all 
what is taking place. Critics of commercial surrogacy such as Dickinson (this volume) 
rightly demonstrate how blatantly economic surrogate arrangements may be masked 
as gifts—and how this mischaracterization may conceal exploitation of surrogates. The 
point is important that misleadinglv characterizing surrogacy as a pure gift may devalue 
the pressures and burdens on the surrogate. But similar concerns apply to regarding 
family caregivers as altruistic actors—and the ethical response is that these caregivers 
should be treated fairly and compensated reasonably, not that they should not engage in 
the care at all. 
In assessing paid surrogacy, it is worth noting that we do allow some intimate activi­
ties for others to be compensated, so it cannot be the intimacy alone that explains oppo­
sition to compensation. Assistants are paid to wash, bathe, feed, and perform bowel care 
tor people who cannot achieve these functions independently. While families often take 
primary roles in performing these functions—and desire to perform such caregiving 
functions out of love—on many views they are neither obligated to do this nor thought 
less of because they rely on help from others who are paid for their work (e.g., Levine 
2005). Wet nursing as a social practice historically was identified with infant abandon­
ment or with aristocratic women handing off tasks they regarded as unpleasant to the 
poor, but today it has garnered increased interest in light of evidence about the negative 
health effects of formula feeding (Stevens, Patrick, and Pickler 2009). 
On the other hand, there may be intimate functions that only or primarily families 
can do, especially functions that rely on close personal knowledge. Hilde Lindemann 
(2009), for example, argues that family members have special responsibilities to con­
struct continuing identities with people with dementia. Or there may be functions 
that should be reserved only to intimates such as the performance of sexual services 
for people with disabilities.16 But that some intimate functions are or should be special 
to families does not show that all are; reasons would still be required for conclud­
ing that gestation is a service that can or should only be performed within the famil­
ial or close friend relationships that are likely to be the context for noncommercial 
surrogacy. 
Further reasons offered for viewing surrogacy as special in a way that precludes com­
mercialization rest in accounts of the surrogates own flourishing, the identity of the 
child, or the desirability of preserving certain forms of parent-child relationships. Two 
early and powerful criticisms of surrogacy—by Margaret Jane Radin and by Elizabeth 
Anderson—both developed arguments that performing this particular kind of intimate 
bodily labor for another is i nconsistent with the pregnant woman's own flourishing. 
Writing before the transition from traditional to gestational surrogacy, both authors 
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addressed commercial forms of traditional surrogacy primarily, but with arguments 
that have more general import. 
In her seminal article about commodification of intimate activities, Margaret lane 
Radin (1987) defended a view of market-inalienability rooted in human flourishing. On 
her account, the dividing line between permissible and impermissible commodification 
lies in core aspects of personhood, freedom, and identity, set in context. Freedom is the 
power to choose for oneself, and identity is the continuing integrity of the selt that is 
necessary for individuation; these interact in the context of environments in which per­
sons seek to constitute themselves. Surrogacy (along with baby selling and prostitution) 
should not be subject to purchase and sale in an ideal world, Radin concludes, because 
they alienate important personal attributes and relationships (p. 1904). A complication 
for a nonideal world is that some forms of at least partial commodification may be tol­
erated to avoid even worse injustices. Commercialized sex is problematic because sex 
should be "freely shared," not engaged in only if the parties believe it i s economically 
worthwhile. However, there may be nonideal contexts in which selling sex is the best of 
very bad options for otherwise impoverished or oppressed women. By contrast, babies 
are not fungible; to sell them is deny their individual identity (p. 1908) and is never ethi­
cally permissible, even in the worst of contexts. 
Surrogacy, Radin thinks, is a more difficult case for a nonideal world, but she con­
cludes that reproductive services should be market-inalienable even in contexts in 
which women have few other choices. Her reasoning is that to sell these services is to 
alienate a core aspect of identity. Much of her concern lies with commercialization, of 
both child and gestating mother, but some of what she says applies also to surrogacy in 
which the gestation is not commercialized. In particular, she deploys her understand­
ing of identity to query whether the gestating woman is regarded as a fungible source 
of something—the child—produced to satisfy the needs or wants of others. Still worse, 
Radin says, what the surrogate does is embedded in gender hierarchy, at least in tra­
ditional surrogacy, where the goal is the father's but not the intended mother's genetic 
child: she is expected to give up her own child, and the intended infertile mother is 
expected to raise someone else's child, all to satisfy the intended father's desire for a 
genetic heir (pp. 1929-1930). These points—that the surrogate's body is b eing used to 
satisfy the wants of another, and that the desire for a surrogate-borne child (that may or 
may not be genetically related) is ineluctably gendered—apply even to noncommercial 
forms of the practice, on Radin's view. 
Along similar lines, Elizabeth Anderson (1990) contends that surrogacy attributes 
the wrong sort of value—use value—to gestation. Legal rules that deprive the sur­
rogate ot any claims to her child, for example by requiring her to relinquish claims 
prebirth or even preconception, deprive her of what is "hers both genetically and 
gestationally" (p. 79). Gestational ties are critical to avoid reducing "the surrogate 
mothers from persons worthy of respect and consideration to objects of mere use ;  
(p. 80). If these ties are not respected, we fail on Anderson's view to treat the surro­
gate in accord with principles consistent with her autonomy and her deeplv felt emo­
tions (p. 81). 
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Undoubtedly, surrogacy uses the woman's body and in this respect treats the body 
as having a use value. The surrogate's body is physically essential for the gestation of 
the resulting child. It is a significant leap from this biological fact, however, to the con­
clusion that the surrogacy relationship fails ethically to treat her as a subject of respect 
and consideration. Surrogacy arrangements that are exploitative would surely be ones 
in which she is not treated with the respect due persons, but this would be true of any 
exploitative arrangement. Surrogacy relationships in which the intended parents regard 
the surrogate only as a vessel for the production of their child and not as a person in her 
own right would also fail to respect the surrogate as a person. But similar concerns apply 
to many service relationships in which the servant is devalued. Moreover, while these 
concerns likely attend some surrogacy arrangements—medical tourism suggests illus­
trations (Pande 2014)—there is no reason to think they must attend all. 
Concerning the surrogate, some have contended that in entering into a surrogacy 
arrangement she fails to treat herself with appropriate self-respect and thus devalues 
herself. This view requires an account of self-respect that would explain why gestating a 
child with the intention that others be its parents cannot demonstrate sufficient respect 
tor oneself. Cecile Fabre (2006) attributes such a view to certain theories of the integ­
rity of the body found in liberalism. On these liberal views, personal services involving 
the body are radically different from taxation: while it might be permissible (albeit not 
for libertarians) to require taxation to meet the material needs of others, it is imper­
missible to command personal services to the same end. Fabre replies that if there are 
duties in justice to provide the poor with material goods needed for a meaningful life 
by means ot taxation, there are also duties in justice to provide them with necessary 
personal services—at least, absent some other reason to differentiate personal services 
from material goods. But what might these reasons be, and can they be applied to sur-
rogacy? I have already set aside arguments that these services are uniquely burdensome 
or intimate. Drawing once again from Radin and Anderson, other arguments might be 
that surrogacy services can never be freely chosen, that these services must compromise 
the surrogates integrity and thus her ability to lead a flourishing life, or that reproduc­
tion must be regarded in a special way that surrogacy does not allow. 
Radin holds that market-inalienability should apply when needed to protect indi­
vidual freedom. Some reasons are prophylactic, if in practice prohibiting any surrogacv 
is necessary to prevent the emergence of coercive surrogacy. Analogous arguments 
ave een made recently about the Swedish law prohibiting the purchase of sex (but 
tn°tJtSKSa'e|8t'lat Pr°hibition voluntary prostitution is necessary to root out human 
™ ,L n^' Aaua' likelihoods of coercion are an empirical question, but it might 
th eS'?et* l'lat coercive surrogacy is more likely in trans-border arrangements 
1 in omestic surrogacy contracts and in arrangements where there is a great deal 
^economic disparity between the parties.19 At a minimum, it is surely important to 
ments ^Uate Protecti°ns against exploitation implemented in all surrogacy arrange-
reprod 'S ffuest'onable whether voluntary self-regulation on the part of 
and followed °^ess'ona's's sufficient to ensure that these protections are implemented 
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Radin also hypothesizes a kind of domino effect, if permitting commercialized ver­
sions of a practice undermines keeping noncommercialized versions intact. It would 
thus be an argument against commercialized surrogacy it its presence undercuts altru­
istic surrogacy, at least assuming that it is desirable for altruistic surrogacy to continue. 
I know of no empirical evidence that this is the case, however, although there surely 
are concerns about unregulated commercial surrogacy in some US states. Moreover, 
noncommercial surrogacy (including compensation tor expenses and lost wages) is 
permitted in many nations across the globe and continues despite the availability of 
commercial forms elsewhere.21 A concern on the other side is that those who favor non-
commercialized surrogacy are more likely to engage a traditional surrogate, which is a 
far riskier endeavor from a family law perspective.22
A related reason given by Radin is that a surrogate cannot act freely. But it i s unclear 
why as a general matter decisions to carry a surrogate pregnancy should all be untree, 
any more so than other pregnancies. Indeed, surrogate pregnancies have an advantage 
over as many as half of other pregnancies at least in that they are planned. So it would 
need to be true that clear, deliberative choices to undergo pregnancy in these circum­
stances cannot be freely undertaken. Surely with appropriate counseling surrogacy 
arrangements can be entered into with full information. Appropriate legal protections 
can give assurances that surrogacy contracts are not adopted as a result of threats or 
coercive economic need. Categorical views about the types of pregnancies that can be 
voluntary—such as that only pregnancies within marriage can be voluntary, or that no 
pregnancies can ever be fully voluntary—would seem to rely on questionable essential-
ist assumptions about the forms that free reproduction can take. 
These points do not take fully into account the possibility that many surrogacy 
choices arise out of such complex circumstances and emotions that they should be 
regarded with suspicion. For example, Fabre cites data to the effect that surrogates 
most frequently enter into the arrangement out of a complexity of emotions, includ­
ing guilt over prior abortions and other "mistakes" (2006, p. 192). If so, this would pro­
vide a reason for concern about whether surrogacy can be seen as evincing appropriate 
self-respect, or as manifesting problematic self-blame. Other data indicate that the 
most likely motivation for surrogacy is the altruistic desire to give parenthood to others 
ladva et al. 2003). Here, too, however, there are concerns about whether in intrafamilial 
arrangements subtle forms of coercion might be operative; for example, a fertile sister 
might feel guilty about her ability to reproduce when confronted with the pain of a sis­
ter who cannot (ESHRE Task Eorce 2011). Surely these pressures are operative in some 
surrogacy decisions; whether they are operative in sufficient numbers to say that the 
practice is unethical is another matter. Moreover, careful counseling can identify many 
cases of inappropriate pressures, even if some may remain. In assessing the evidence 
about the likelihood that surrogates are not choosing freely, care must be taken not to 
assume that reproductive choices must be irrational or subject to emotions so strong as 
to overwhelm choice. 
A related argument made by surrogacv's critics is that the surrogate fails to recog­
nize the inevitable emotional ties resulting from gestation. Some claims about these ties 
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were hypothesized before gestational surrogacy's replacement of traditional surrogacy. 
But even with gestational surrogacy, surely the biological changes associated with preg­
nancy and birth will generate emotional reactions. It is an empirical matter what forms 
these emotions are likely to take, how severe they are likely to be, or whether they are 
likely to interfere with the surrogate's subsequent life to an extent that suggests that sur­
rogacy is wrong. One recent (albeit small) study indicates that although the immedi­
ate postbirth period is difficult, surrogates do not show signs of depression or reduced 
self-esteem 10 years after birth (Jadva, Imrie, and Golombok 2014). Moreover, surro­
gates frequently maintain contact with the intended parents and offspring to an extent 
that they find satisfying. Arguing that the emotional reactions of pregnancy must be so 
strong or manifested in a parent-child relationship—so that surrogacy is inconsistent 
with self-respect—would appear at best a risky strategy for feminists who want to avoid 
essentialist commitments about the nature of women's emotions. 
Another freedom-based concern is that surrogacy contracts may be structured to 
commit the woman to relinquish the child before birth, or even before pregnancy has 
been achieved. Critics argue that this precommitment does not respect the woman's lib­
erty to change her mind about a very important life event. Some contend that women 
even when they believe they have completed their own families may not be able to antic­
ipate the emotions they will feel upon being expected to surrender the child they have 
borne after birth, and so should not be committed to this until after the child's arrival. 
On this view, no surrogacy contracts could be enforceable unless they provide a win­
dow of choice postpartum for the surrogate to decide whether to relinquish her paren­
tal rights. These arguments against precommitment were developed when traditional 
surrogacy was the primary form of the practice; it is u nderstandable that women with 
genetic ties to the child might feel differently about relinquishment than women with­
out genetic ties as would be the case with gestational surrogacy, as is also illustrated in 
the case of adoption. 
In assessing surrogacy arrangements involving prebirth commitments, it is useful to 
ask whether surrogacy contracts are unique in the likelihood of subsequent regret, or 
whether there are other proposed contracts that are judged impermissible because of 
their unanticipated emotional burdens when the time comes for enforcement. Several 
doctrines in contract law might be analytically helpful here (see Fabre 2006, pp. 215-
216). On a theory of unilateral mistake, contracts are voidable if one party held a mis­
taken belief at the time the contract was entered, that party does not bear the risk of the 
mistake under the contract, and either enforcement of the contract would be uncon­
scionable or the other party had reason to know of the mistake at the time of contracting 
or was at fault for the mistake.2 ' Typical cases of unilateral mistake are sales in which 
the seller was grossly in error about the nature of the item sold and seeks to undo the 
deal. In surrogacy, the mistake would be the surrogate's belief about her future feelings 
about relinquishing the child and the judgment that enforcement of the contract would 
be unconscionable would be based on the surrogate's attachment to the child. Cases in 
which contracts are voidable for unilateral mistake are very unusual, however, given the 
aim of contract law to introduce stability into exchange relationships. If surrogacv is 
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different, perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that surrogate contracts lacking a post­
partum window should be unenforceable as unconscionable. This introduces an ele­
ment of uncertainty into any surrogacy agreement, although in the vast majority of cases 
the arrangement will conclude as planned. In any event, a determination that freedom 
requires this limitation on surrogacy contracts is not an argument against surrogacy, but 
only for structuring surrogacy contracts to give surrogates the liberty to change their 
minds within a postpartum window. 
Yet another reason for rejecting surrogacy is the judgment that surrogacy expresses 
the wrong sort of regard for ones reproductive capacities. On this view, the surrogate 
sees her reproductive capacities as something to be used to produce a child tor someone 
else rather than for her own parenting. It would be question begging to argue that sur­
rogacy is wrong because it is wrong to use ones reproductive capacities tor another— 
whether or not this use is wrong is exactly what is at issue. Radin, Anderson, and other 
writers argue that reproduction is al ienated if the child is for another; the idea here is 
that reproduction must be linked to the intention to parent (even though there are cir­
cumstances such as wartime, privation, or disease in which it seems unlikely that the 
intention will come to fruition). For example, Stuart Oultram writes that "women who 
donate eggs arguably do so in an alienated way in so much as they donate to assist others 
rather than because they want to become parents themselves" (2015, p. 472). Christine 
Overall advances a similar point in arguing that surrogacy demonstrates inadequate 
levels of care for the child: "it must be acknowledged that the gestating woman creates 
the baby not because she wants it for its own sake but precisely in order to give it away; 
so her caring certainly has strict limits (2015, p. 354). And Carole Pateman (1988) argues 
that surrogacy is wrong because it detaches women from their reproductive identities. 
Now, powerful reasons for linking reproduction to the intention to parent are pro­
tection of the resulting child or the parent-child relationship. It is unclear, however, 
why the parenting intention or the parent-child relation must lie between the gestating 
woman and the child she bears, and not between the child and the intended parents 
notably even in cases in which they are the genetic parents of the child, having contrib­
uted the gametes used in in vitro fertilization, or in which neither the surrogate nor the 
intended parents are genetically related to the child because conception was achieved 
with a donated embryo). In any event, subsequent sections will take up regard for the 
child and regard for the parent-child relationship. Here, the issue is why reproduction 
would be problematic because it is not linked to the gestating woman's own intention 
to parent and it is hard to see what an answer would be that is not simply a rejection of 
surrogacy. 
A final possibility is that in becoming a surrogate, a woman compromises her own 
ability to have a meaningful conception of her good. Conceptual claims to this effect 
might be that having a child for another cannot be part of a meaningful conception of 
the good, or that intending to parent a child one bears must be part of a meaningful 
conception of one's good. But it is hard to see why these claims are not question begging. 
Empirical versions of this concern would be that surrogacy is such a commitment that 
it precludes other activities that are critical to a meaningful conception of one's good. 
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If surrogacy compromised women's later capabilities to form partnerships or families, 
or reduced the likelihood of surrogates pursuing educations or satisfying careers, this 
would indeed be a weighty concern. But there are ways of selecting surrogates that blunt 
this objection. Surrogacy could be limited to women who have already had children or 
to those whose partners consent—although either of these limits might themselves be 
regarded as impermissible restrictions on reproductive liberty. Moreover, many women 
become surrogates because they believe that surrogacy will further their conceptions of 
their good. With commercial surrogacy, women may engage in the practice to provide 
more than they would otherwise be able to for their own children, or to stay at home 
with their children rather than entering the workforce in other ways. Some women 
become surrogates in order to pay for their educations. To be sure, care must be taken 
that these arrangements are not exploitative. But in practice there surely are contexts in 
which surrogacy does not detract from and even furthers the surrogate's well-formed 
conception of her good. 
Surrogacy s critics also argue that the practice is inevitably gendered, as it imposes 
the male intended parent's preferences on the surrogate or compels his partner to raise 
another's child. This objection, if it has purchase at all, applies most clearly to situations 
such as the Baby M case in which the traditional surrogate is artificially inseminated 
with the intended father's sperm. Many surrogate pregnancies today involve the gametes 
of the intended parents or gametes from unrelated donors. In such cases, the genetic tie 
to the child may be as important to the female partner as to the male. Surrogacy is also 
a reproductive option for same-sex couples wanting to become parents through means 
other than adoption. Although surely some pregnancies and some surrogate pregnan­
cies involve gendered pressures to have "his" child, it is by no means necessary for all or 
many surrogate pregnancies to do so. It would seem particularly odd to make this argu­
ment in the cases in which a w oman's oocyte and donated sperm are used, or gametes 
from neither intended parent are used, or the intended parents are a same-sex couple. 
At most, the concerns about gender hierarchy seem applicable to surrogacy using sperm 
from the male intended parent but donated oocytes, as might be the case for older cou­
ples seeking to become parents. But t his would yield the odd result: that surrogacy is 
ethically problematic in just the case in which gametes of the male intended parent are 
used. A far more reasonable position is to screen and counsel surrogates and intended 
parents to do the best to assure that the choices of all parties are genuinely made in a 
manner free from pressure. 
SURROGACY: THE CHILD'S 
INTERESTS AND IDENTITY 
Surrogacy is about assisting in the creation of a baby for another. Many objections to sur­
rogacy contend that it is "baby selling." In noncommercial surrogacy, these objections 
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do not hold, but other concerns about the baby may apply. Before turning to these other 
objections, however, it is important to unpack what might be the subject of sale in com­
mercial surrogacy. Here are some possibilities: the child, rights of the child, rights over 
the child, or gestational services. It is generally agreed that the sale ot a human being by 
another human being is wrong: it treats the person as a commodity, violates the person's 
freedom and dignity, and likely subjects the person to oppression or worse. It also treats 
persons as fungible commodities, exchangeable for other commodities with more desir­
able characteristics if the price is right. Children are not fungible commodities and must 
not be treated as such, either by the producing surrogate or by the intended parents. 
Fabre draws the conclusion that the surrogate must regard the child as more than an 
object with exchange value, as must the receiving parents. This regard, she thinks, dif­
ferentiates surrogacy from the case of a celebrity couple having a baby to sell it t o the 
highest bidder, or of parents deciding to put an older child up tor bids. 
But if we distinguish such sales regarding the person as a fungible commodity—in 
which there is a paid transfer of all rights and duties over the person as object—from 
the sale of more particular rights of or over the person (Fabre 2006, p. 190; Hanna 2010J, 
whether these other forms of sale are objectionable is more complex. Parenthetically, 
it should be noted that there are other cases in which the use value of a child is coupled 
with respect for the child in his or her own right. Consider the creation of so-called 
replacement babies for a child who has died (Encyclopedia of Death and Dying 2016) or 
savior siblings for a child in need of stem cell replacement after high-dose chemother­
apy (Sheldon and Wilkinson 2003). Although these practices are ethically controversial, 
many contend that they are ethically permissible as long as the resulting child will be 
raised in a loving fashion. 
The impermissibility of the sale of rights of the person depends on what those rights 
are and the process of sale. Many rights of persons—ordinary property rights, for 
example—are subject to sale at the discretion of the person. Other rights—liberty rights, 
rights to be a property owner, or rights to nondiscrimination—are judged on many 
political theories not to be alienable in this way. Commercial surrogacy presses whether 
the child's right to particular parents could be subject to sale. But a core question about 
surrogacy is whether the child has a right to be raised by a gestational parent—or instead 
whether genetic or social ties are the basis for the child's right to be parented by the 
persons with those ties. From the claim that the child has a right to be parented, or the 
weaker claim that the child has a right to be assured that his or her needs will be met and 
that she will be afforded the opportunities requisite for a meaningful life, it does not fol­
low that the child has a right to be parented by her gestational parent. It would, of course, 
follow that the child's rights to adequate parenting, welfare, or opportunities must be 
protected in any surrogacy arrangement and that surrogacy arrangements without such 
protections are impermissible. 
An additional complication about the child's rights is that children cannot act for 
themselves. This complication does not mean that rightsof the child cannot be alienated, 
but it does mean that any alienation must be subject to conditions that protect the inter­
ests of the child and that hold open critically important choices for the child to make at 
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a later time to the extent possible (e.g., Davis 1997, Feinberg 1980, Mills 2003). To be per­
missible, surrogacy arrangements must respect these constraints. In this regard, there is 
an important dispute about whether children should be told the circumstances of their 
conception or gestation, including information about the identity of gamete donors or 
surrogates. This issue is considered by Glenn Cohen's contribution to this volume. 
In commercial surrogacy, another possible object of sale is the gestating parent's 
parental rights over the child. Elizabeth Anderson, for example, has argued that paren­
tal rights of genetic parents should not be bought or sold (1990, p. 79). In considering 
whether selling these rights is objectionable, it is worth noting that some sales of rights 
over persons may be permissible, depending on the context and the rights in question. 
Although most political philosophies agree it is wrong for persons to sell themselves 
into slavery, or to be sold into slavery, it is not so clear that it is wrong for people to 
buy themselves out of slavery or for others to do so on their behalf, thus extinguishing 
the rights of slaveholders. (Of course, this would only be an issue in partial compliance 
theory, as slavery itself is wrong.) Radin contends that it is wrong for parents to sell their 
rights to a child, because it is in effect selling the child (1987, p. 1904). But this raises the 
question whether sale of these particular rights over a child treats the child as an obiect 
of sale; I have argued earlier that it need not do so if the rights and interests of the child 
are protected. 
"let another possibility is that it wrongs the gestational parent for her parental rights 
to be subject to sale. Surely it does when the circumstances of sale are coercive, but it is 
a different question whether it does so in other cases. The preceding section argued that 
the sale of gestational services is not a wrong to the surrogate if it occurs in a context 
in which she is adequately protected. Such sales need not interfere with her libertv, her 
integrity, or her ability to lead a meaningful life if they are structured in ways that protect 
her adequately. Leaving for the next section whether commercial surrogacy appropri­
ately respects the parent-child relationship, similar reasoning can be applied to the sale 
of parental rights. 
A further question is whether the gestational surrogate has parental rights to sell or 
to gi\e away in the first place. Why parental rights should attach exclusively or at all to 
t e gestational parent is itself at issue in surrogacy. Elizabeth Anderson argued about 
tra itional surrogacy that a consent-intent" conceptualization of parenthood—that 
t ie intended parents are the possessors of parental rights—makes parenthood arbitrary, 
nstea , s e argues for recognition of genetic ties as determinative of parenthood: in 
recognizing these ties, she says, "we help to secure children's interests in having an 
assure p ace in the world, which is more firm than the wills of their parents ... it] 
oes not make the obligation to care for those whom one has created (intentionally 
, , cont'n8ent upon an arbitrary desire to do so" (1990, p. 79). This view, however, 
she ;,r rental "^ts in t{le surrogate only when she is the genetic parent, which 
the intP 71 & m CaSeS °f gestational surrogacy where the genetic parents will either be 
tal riphJ1 6 ^3rentS 0r d°nors- It would seem implausible to assume that vesting paren-
minatinn 7 i'S W'" most Protechve of children. This suggests that the deter-
w lere to locate parental rights is a normative choice, constructed rather 
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than determined by some "natural" feature such as gestation or genetics. For a variety 
of historical reasons, among them identifying stable sources of parenting for children, 
legal regimes have identified gestating women and their partners during gestation as 
the legal parents of the child, but there is nothing inevitable about this location. On the 
other side of gestational parenting is the argument that the failure to recognize the role 
of the intended parent devalues the role of persons in initiating reproductive projects 
Robertson 1996; see also Oultram 2015). 
In addition to stable parenting and protection of the child's interests, another issue 
that has been raised about surrogacy is the child's identity. Understanding identity is far 
beyond the scope of this discussion, but it s hould be noted briefly that there are many 
different accounts of identity not at all linked to genetics or gestation. Especially impor­
tant here are views of identity as social (e.g., Appiah 2014,2005). Such accounts may link 
identity to nation, culture, race, sex, disability, or religion, among other social construc­
tions. To hold that children's identity is violated if their genetic parents do not raise them 
is to ignore the complexity of these matters. And it is also, of course, to re ject any repro­
duction in which gamete donation plays a part, as well as adoption. Children need iden­
tities, but it is far from clear that these must be identities constructed by their genetic 
parents. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GESTATING 
A final set of criticisms of surrogacy claims that it h as a mistaken view of the parent-
child relationship. The surrogate interacts with the baby in carrying it, these critics 
argue, and this relationship is not respected if th e child is given away. In this respect, 
pregnancy is a unique form of labor. Overall writes: "The situation of a pregnant woman 
is radically different f rom the situation of a factory worker. 'Ike factory worker brings 
only his skill and labor to the factory; he does not provide the materials on which he 
labors or the environment in which he labors. The pregnant woman, on the other hand, 
is, herself, the environment in which her reproductive labor is performed. She also 
provides the materials out of which the child is created" (Overall 2015, p. 357). Earlier 
sections of this chapter have considered the interests of the surrogate and the child sepa­
rately; the view to be explored here is that the pregnancy itself creates a relationship that 
is not properly respected by relinquishment of the child. On this view, there must be 
overriding reasons—such as the incapacity ofgestators—to warrant sundering this rela­
tionship, but these reasons do not obtain in surrogacy. 
But why should gestation be regarded as ethically weighty in this way? To be sure, 
9 months of interaction with a f etus (assuming the pregnancy is carried to term) has 
effects on the woman's body and emotions that must be taken into account. And the 
child in utero has experiences, too; there is evidence that after birth children respond 
in particular ways to prebirth experiences. These facts may be taken to have meta­
physical significance, as Hilde Lindemann (this volume) explores. But whether these 
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pU considerations yield the conclusion that the gestational relationship should have over-





di( This chapter has addressed objections to surrogacy that do not depend on exploita-
ga, tion or commercialization. It has argued that reasons offered for claims that surrogacv 
of wrongs the surrogate, the resulting child, or the parent-child relationship would rule 
H0 out other practices widely regarded as permissible, devalue the desire of infertile couples 
ad. t0  become intended parents, or assume the impermissibility of surrogacy. The examina-
tlii tion of these arguments does reveal important cautions about surrogacy, however. Care 
ph must be taken to assure that all parties are well informed as to risks. Both surrogates and 
fie ' intended parents must be carefully evaluated. Interests of the child in adequate parent­
ing must be assured. Although payment for surrogacy is not per se problematic, exploi­
tation is a risk of surrogacy; the protections in place today in at least some jurisdictions 
may not be adequate safeguards, especially when surrogacy is commercialized. Finally, 
protection of the woman's choice about matters important to identity and relationships 
is a reason for giving her the option to relinquish any parental claims she might have 
after birth. 
NOTES 
1. For example, Christine Overall (2014) has recently proposed a system of parental licensing 
for people using surrogates. 
2. A symposium issue of the Washington Law Review published in December 2014 does 
consider whether commercial surrogacy should be more widely available in light of the 
decision of the US Supreme Court rejecting California's ban on same-sex marriage. The 
contribution by David Orentlicher to this volume contains an excellent summary of state 
laws concerning surrogacy, including limits on traditional surrogacy and commercial 
surrogacy. 
3. For an argument that legal preferences for gestational surrogacy mistakenly limit the lib­
erty of surrogates and intended parents, and impose greater risks and costs on all parties, 
see Shapiro (2014). 
4. In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396,537 A .2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
5. 109 N.J. at 425. 
6. Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr .2d 494,851 P. 2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
7. 851 P.2dat784. 
8. 851 P .2d at 782. 
9. 851 P. 2d at 787. 
10. 851 P .2d at 784. 
11. A.W.H&P.W. v. G.H.B.,339 N.J.Super. 495,503 (2000). 
12. In re T.J.S., 212 N.J. 334,54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012). 
I S  S UR R O G A C Y  ET H I C A L L Y  P RO B L E M A T I C ?  4 0 5  
13. Ibid, at 336 (Hoens, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
14. Washington is an example, West's RCWA 26.26.101, 26.26.230. By comparison, organ 
donation is another example of bodily use in service of another that many believe ought 
not to be commercialized, even leaving aside risks of exploitation; this view is imple­
mented in the prohibition on organ sales in the United States and elsewhere. 
15. Shapiro (2014) extends this fairness concern in arguing that compensation isn't the impor­
tant issue for feminist analysis of surrogacy; instead, power dynamics and exploitation are 
critical to judgments of forms of surrogacy. 
;6. Commercialization aside, the therapeutic sex performed with a man with severe physical 
disabilities in the movie 'IJie Sessions would be regarded as inappropriate on this basis. The 
movie is based on the story of Mark O'Brian, "On Seeing a Sex Surrogate." http://noteasyb-
eingred.tumblr.com/post/16646893808/on-seeing-a-sex-surrogate-mark-obrian. 
17. For a discussion of the difference between use value and exchange value, see Dickenson, 
this volume. 
18. estonicialco. "Sweden's Prostitution Solution: Why Hasn't Anyone Tried This Before?" 
http://prostitutionresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Swedens-Prostitution-
Solution.pdf. 
19. Jeffrey Kirby (2014) explains why current transnational practices are coercive and how 
they might be rendered less so. 
20. For an excellent discussion of protections for surrogates, see ASRM Ethics Committee 
2013. Although ASRM requires its members to subscribe to the standards and principles 
of the Society, this does not prevent nonmembers from engaging in activities that ASRM 
would find unethical. 
21. The European Society of Human Reproduction and Endocrinology, for example, takes 
the position that noncommercial surrogacy is the only permissible form of the practice, 
including payment for medical expenses not otherwise covered, expenses of pregnancy, 
and lost wages (ESI IRE Task Force 2005). 
22. I owe this point to Judith Daar. 
23. Rest. (2d) Contracts § 153. 
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